Community Fiber Networks: Bringing Competition and World-Class Infrastructure to American Cities

In the following video, President Obama announced several steps his Administration is taking to encourage municipally-owned broadband networks, as well as the rationale for taking them.

A few weeks after the president’s January 14 speech, the FCC announced it would be voting on a similar approach to municipal broadband at its February 26 meeting, where it will also vote on a proposal to classify broadband access as a Title II common carrier.  Since community broadband is a topic I hope to write about here in the future, and the Commission’s meeting is only two weeks away, I thought I’d share some initial thoughts on the subject, using the President’s plan and its significance as a focal point.

As always, feedback (especially from those who see this issue differently) is welcome…

Nearly all of us would agree that free markets are fundamental to the strength of the American economy. But we sometimes forget that markets need real competition to be truly “free.” A good example is the local farmers market, where we can compare the quality and price of each vendor’s produce before deciding what to buy. A vendor offering poor quality at a premium price won’t attract much business, since shoppers can readily find substitutes with better quality and/or lower prices.

When it comes to Internet access, however, competition and choice are sorely lacking for most Americans.  President Obama understands this, and on January 14, he announced a set of initiatives aimed at increasing competition in the Internet access market. The main thrust of his program is to make it easier for underserved communities to invest in their own state-of-the-art fiber optic network. These are the kind of networks that dominant ISPs rarely build, but that experts and local communities are recognizing as essential 21st century infrastructure.

A key part of the President’s agenda is to remove laws in the roughly 20 states that make it impossible or nearly so for communities to invest in this kind of advanced network. In most cases, the impetus for these laws came from lobbying funded by the state’s dominant cable and telephone companies. Though claiming to support competition, they’ve spent heavily to block it.

These large ISPs argue that competition and choice is already abundant in the Internet access market. But the evidence says otherwise.

As many of us are reminded every time we wait on hold, or for an installer or repair tech to arrive, or for service to return after the latest outage, Internet access in most American cities is nothing like the farmers market described above.  As study after study has shown, the dominant ISPs are among the least popular companies in the nation, and have remained so for years.  In a truly competitive market, companies like Comcast and Time Warner Cable, which consistently rank at or near the bottom in customer satisfaction, would not at the same time be claiming the lion’s share of customer growth.  But that is the case for high-speed Internet, where competitive options– especially for very high speeds–are too often not available.

The lack of competitive options seems pretty clear when you look at data compiled by the FCC and NTIA.  For example, a paper accompanying the President’s announcement noted that more than 55% of U.S. households have only one option if they want Internet download speeds of 25 Mbps (in most cases that provider is a cable operator), while more than 19% can’t get those speeds from ANY provider. That’s roughly 75% of homes without competitive options for the kind of speeds increasingly in demand thanks to the growing popularity of services like Netflix, Hulu, YouTube and Skype, which provide competitive alternatives to the TV and phone services provided by the dominant ISPs.  On top of this is the proliferation of multiple devices per household, and the potentially massive bandwidth requirements of new applications with potential to transform our nation’s education, healthcare and manufacturing sectors.  [For a more extensive analysis of competitive dynamics, feel free to check out this draft report I prepared last year based on industry data as of YE2013]

There are, however, some exceptions to this lack of competition, and some of the most notable ones are in cities that have taken the initiative to invest in state-of-the-art fiber optic network infrastructure. These networks provide powerful competition to incumbent service providers, offering gigabit (1,000 Megabit) speeds at attractive prices, and high-quality customer service provided locally, not from some distant location in another state or country.

And “Gigabit Cities” such as Chattanooga, TN and Lafayette, LA are thriving, becoming hot-beds of entrepreneurial activity and innovation in technology, education, healthcare and government services, and rich with civic pride and sense of community.

The president’s action is reminiscent of similar steps taken by past presidents from both parties who recognized the essential role of world-class infrastructure in keeping our nation strong.

Imagine where we’d be today if FDR, a Democrat, hadn’t mobilized federal support for expanding electricity to America’s small towns and farms via cooperatives and municipal utilities when private power companies didn’t see enough profit in serving these areas. Or if Eisenhower, a Republican, decided it was best to wait until private investors saw healthy profits in building an interstate highway system. We might still be waiting, or paying highway tolls that increase as fast as our cable TV bills!

Federal policies to encourage community-owned networks–as reflected in President Obama’s speech and the FCC’s upcoming vote– reaffirm two national priorities that helped make our country the envy of the world for more than two centuries: strong support for truly competitive markets, and a commitment to make world-class infrastructure available to all our citizens as they pursue a better life for themselves and their children.

Primary takeaways

  • Digital inequality shows larger impacts on youth academic performance as compared to time spent on screens.

  • Digital skills play a significant role in mediating unstructured online engagement (social media use, playing video games, browsing the web) and youth academic, social, and psychosocial development.

  • Unstructured online engagement and face-to-face social interaction are complementary and continuously interact to create and enhance youth capital outcomes.


A familiar story: concerns of screen time

Today’s discussions of adolescent well-being have coalesced around a clear narrative: teenagers spend too much time online, and their academic performance, mental health, and social lives are deteriorating as a result. A steady stream of academic papers, books, and op-eds, alongside a growing number of policy proposals––school phone bans, age-gated social media use, restrictive screen-time limits––rest on the same underlying claim, aligning with a contemporary, digitized version of the displacement hypothesis:

Screen time, particularly the unstructured, free-time spent on social media, gaming, watching video content, or browsing the web, is said to displace the productive face-to-face activities that build adolescents into capable adults.

The implied and often practiced solution is restriction. In response, this dissertation tested this claim directly, and placed it within the broader context of adolescence.

Across three years, I followed 653 Michigan adolescents from early through late adolescence: in grades 8 or 9 (survey one, 2019) to grades 11 or 12 (survey two, 2022). Notably, these students, studied over time, were part of a broader pooled sample of 5,825 students across the same eighteen highschools. The study window captured the year before and the year after the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdown orders, functioning as an unprecedented stress test for theories of adolescent social, academic, and digital life and, importantly, as a benchmark to compare the effects of pandemic-related change and inequality to those effects from screen time alone.

Across four studies of adolescents, consisting of six cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, findings are not consistent with the displacement narrative, nor the broader concerns about the time youth spend on screens.

Findings are, however, consistent with something the current public and (most) academic discussions have largely overlooked or ignored: the gaps and inequalities that determine whether adolescents can access and use the internet meaningfully in the first place.

What the displacement hypothesis overlooks

Displacement and related research and policy concerning the time young people spend online assumes a “zero-sum” model of adolescent day-to-day time. An hour online is an hour not spent studying, reading, sleeping, or interacting face-to-face (i.e., time spent on more productive or developmentally “better” activity).

Indeed, this makes sense logically. However, as an empirical claim, this model requires time spent online to behave differently from all other ways adolescents allocate time; it must produce uniquely negative outcomes and be inherently harmful across digital contexts, rather than the typical mix of trade-offs corresponding to, and often overlooked among any other social or developmental context.

Yet, online time does not differ from other youth activity. Instead, I find it has a mix of pros, cons, and even some “uniquely digital” benefits which youth utilize for social and academic gains. When I compared unstructured digital media use against traditional face-to-face interaction and activities, both produced similar patterns: some negative associations with academic outcomes, some null, and some positive.

Trade-offs within traditional face-to-face activity (for example, social time with friends and family, or time spent in after-school extracurriculars) are treated as ordinary developmental experiences that must be experienced for the betterment of development. The identical trade-offs involving digital time tend to be overlooked or ignored, and online engagement is perceived as altogether harmful.

A growing body of evidence, including this dissertation, do not support that distinction. Indeed, the developmental context is routinely misread, leaving out the context of the experiences and time spent on digital, as well as face-to-face activities, interactions, existing inequalities, and changes inherent to development. As such, I proposed a novel framework to understand these contexts:

Digital capital exchange

Rather than treating screen time as a unified harm, this dissertation advances an exchange”-based framework, grounded in James Coleman’s theories of youth capital and digital inequality scholarship, particularly following Eszter Hargittai, Jan van Dijk, and Alexander van Deursen (see this list of all dissertation references for full works).

The core proposition is that adolescents’ online engagement is not an alternative to developmental activity but another, albiet modern domain through which young people accumulate and mobilize online resources––particularly digital skills––that work alongside existing social networks and experiences to be exchanged for human capital (measured as: academic achievement, aspirations, STEM interest) and social capital (peer networks, community participation, extracurricular involvement).

Online time is not the mechanism; instead, it is digital skills that I find to be the most vital component in youth capital exchange and enhancement. Unstructured online engagement contributes to online skills; those skills, accumulated and mobilized alongside existing peer, family, and community networks, translate into the outcomes researchers and parents care about, i.e., academic achievement, aspirations, and face-to-face interaction and social networks.

This digital capital framework treats online and in-person contexts as complementary rather than antagonistic, and it situates adolescents’ digital lives within the structural conditions––connectivity quality, device reliability, autonomy of use––that determine whether exchange can occur at all.


Methods (in brief)

Paper-and-pencil surveys were administered to students in classrooms at two time-points: spring 2019 (N=2,876) and spring 2022 (N=2,949), across the same eighteen predominantly rural Michigan schools, grades 8–12. Official, nationally-ranked standardized reading, writing, and math test scores (PSAT 8/9, PSAT 10, SAT; College Board) were then anonymously linked to students’ survey responses with the help of participating districts.

Cross-sectional path analyses modeled pooled and wave-specific samples (pooled N=5,825); two-wave cross-lagged panel models tested reciprocal, longitudinal relationships on the 653 students who completed both surveys. Multi-group analyses of the cross-lagged panel models compared relationships between girls (N=345) and boys (N=308). All longitudinal models included time-invariant socioeconomic covariates as well as time-varying covariates to reduce omitted-variable bias.

Key findings: an overview

To summarize, to the best of my ability, eight chapters across 376 pages, I present two primary findings:

First: digital inequality predicted larger and more consistent declines in human capital than screen time did.

Unreliable home internet and technology maintenance problems––experiencing and/or dealing with broken or outdated devices and software, restrictive school-issued hardware, issues with connecting to or maintaining internet access––decreased youth GPA and standardized test achievement. And, these effect sizes were substantially larger than any negative direct effect from unstructured digital media use.

Across all four empirical studies, digital inequality emerged as the most substantial predictor of academic and developmental decline.

Second: digital skills mediated the relationship between online time and adolescent academic and social outcomes.

Unstructured digital media use, particularly online gaming and web browsing, predicted higher internet and social media skills for adolescents, which in turn predicted stronger academic achievement and self-efficacy (human capital), and social interaction and extracurricular participation (social capital). The positive indirect effect of screen time through skills offset or exceeded any small negative direct effects across several outcomes (supporting our existing peer-reviewed work: Hales & Hampton, 2025, and which you can read more about here).

These exchange processes were amplified when peer and family networks were modeled alongside digital skills, consistent with the premise that online and offline contexts operate together rather than in competition. The effect was not universal: social media skills amplified rather than offset a negative association with consistency of interest, one of the two subscales of grit. The exchange framework describes a contextual and conditional, domain-specific mechanism, not a blanket defense of time spent online.

Implications

If digital inequality, and not screen time, is the primary predictor of adolescent academic and developmental decline, and still warrants concern regarding access quality and experience even with the broader adoption of digital devices across the United States, the current policy emphasis on restriction is pointed at the wrong target. The evidence supports a different set of priorities.

Stable, reliable home (fast) broadband should be treated as an educational prerequisite rather than a consumer amenity. Unreliable connectivity exerted larger downward pressure on human capital than any measure of screen time, and that pressure intensified during the pandemic-era reliance on digital infrastructure. Technology maintenance, device repair, replacement, technical support, and the flexibility to install software and explore the web autonomously, matters as much as initial access, and school-issued devices that restrict autonomous use appear to hinder skill accumulation rather than support it.

Restrictive parental mediation of internet use was negatively associated with grit and self-efficacy at magnitudes comparable to the positive contributions of face-to-face activity. This challenges the assumption that digital restriction functions protectively. Instructive mediation, teaching adolescents to verify information, navigate platforms critically, and mobilize online resources toward meaningful ends, is the posture the data supports.

Finally, the technical skill-building that occurs through gaming, self-directed exploration, and deep web use is skill-building, not wasted time. Closing the persistent gender gap in these domains likely requires legitimizing technical play for girls, rather than restricting it for everyone.

None of the above is an argument that screen time is benign. It is an argument that screen time is the wrong focus, particularly when studied mostly in isolation. Context matters substantially, whether that is time spent on other activities during adolescence, the period of adolescence itself, digital inequality, resources gained from such online use, and how all such factors interact. The factor that predicts whether a given adolescent can convert online engagement into capital outcomes is structural: access, infrastructure, skills, and the autonomy to use them. These factors are distributed unevenly, and its uneven distribution, not hours logged, is what separates adolescents who thrive from those who fall behind.

The full dissertation is available through Michigan State University’s ProQuest archive, or see the embedded full-text PDF below. I’m happy to share papers, preprints, or the underlying framework with anyone interested and working in this area––don’t hesitate to reach out via my contact form. Thanks for reading.

Community Fiber Networks: Bringing Competition and World-Class Infrastructure to American Cities