Evolving Infrastructure Models: Telecom, Electricity & the IoT

Though not as essential as drinking water, I consider both electricity and Internet access to be core infrastructure, with high fixed costs and providing general purpose support for the requirements of modern life.

As the Internet expands to include networked “things” as well as people, and electric utilities pursue a future “smart grid,” the scope of these two sectors’ activity seem likely to overlap more than ever in the future. One example of this is the widespread deployment by utilities of so-called “smart meters” connected via the utility’s own (usually wireless) network. Though it’s unclear how this strategy will evolve (and, as I explain here, its most typical forms may be seriously flawed), it strikes me as a step toward creating an Internet of Things (IoT) in which utility-controlled devices provide key control functions.

This movement of electric utilities into the communication space raises some interesting questions about how all this will and should evolve. Two related issues come initially to mind.

One is the general approach we take as a society to ensure that companies operating in core infrastructure sectors serve the public interest. In the telecom and Internet space, the model that has evolved over the years is mainly one of encouraging facilities-based competition (as I discussed in an earlier post, the Lansing area [and my own household] is currently benefiting from such competition). And though the FCC recently added to this a Title II-based framework for enforcing key non-discrimination requirements, the Commission emphasized its intention to make heavy use of regulatory forbearance in achieving this policy goal.  As this communication policy model has evolved at the federal level, the regulatory powers of state and local government have been steadily and considerably diminished in the telecom/Internet space.

In contrast, the locus of public interest policy enforcement in the electric power industry has remained state-level regulatory agencies. And while there has been an increase in choice and competition in the provision of centralized power generation, there is virtually no facilities-based competition in retail distribution, and considerable disagreement about how to handle distributed generation, most notably rooftop solar.  Whereas the Internet has enabled its users to become producers as well as consumers of online-enabled content and services, the evolution to an “empowered prosumer” future is less clear and increasingly contentious in the electric power industry.

This ties into another issue, which relates to the control of customer premise devices and the customer-related information they collect and transmit to the utility. In a paper entitled “Getting Smarter About the Smart Grid,” Timothy Schoechle suggested the electric utility industry look to the telecom sector for guidance rather than move forward with their current “smart meter” plans.

The demarcation between monopoly utility space and customer market space was clarified over two decades ago in the case of wire-line telephone monopolies with the decisions and policy changes culminating in the divestiture of AT&T. One result was enormous…growth in new markets for premises equipment and services. The electricity grid today is facing the same demarcation inflection point as the telephone network experienced. The gateway belongs to the consumer, not to the electric utility. A demarcation and opening of the consumer premises space to market competition could unleash the creative energy of the consumer electronics industry, the home appliance industry, and others. Full two-way smart grid communication among premises-based systems, products, and services—facilitated by a consumer-controlled gateway device and already available data services (i.e., Internet and Web access via DSL, cable, fiber, etc.) —would free the smart grid from the stifling control of utilities and their proprietary meter-reading networks…

Data to be collected by the smart meters, including intimate personal details of citizens’ lives, is not necessary to the basic purpose of the smart grid—supply/demand balancing, demand response (DR), dynamic pricing, renewable integration, or local generation and storage—as promoters of the meters, and uninformed parties, routinely claim. Instead, the meter data is serving to create an extraneous market for consumer data mining and advertising (i.e., “big data” analytics).

A concern I have regarding the electric power industry’s evolution to a “smart grid” and renewable-rich, low-carbon future is whether traditional state regulatory agencies have the necessary multidisciplinary expertise, regulatory systems and broad vision to guide this evolution wisely, especially amidst signs that global warming is reaching dangerous and potentially irreversible levels faster than expected, and the fact that the smart grid represents a significant extension into the communication sector. (Note: some cities, including Lansing and East Lansing, the Quello Center’s home base, are served by municipally-owned utilities, which are typically not subject to the same level of state regulatory oversight as investor owned utilities.)

Perhaps this is an appropriate topic for study by MSU’s Institute of Public Utilities, which includes faculty from multiple colleges, including some with close ties to the Quello Center and/or the Media and Information department in MSU’s College of Communication Arts and Sciences. With so much at stake for the future of our nation’s electrical grid, the IoT, and society as a whole, it certainly seems a topic worthy of the kind of multidisciplinary analysis that IPU seems well positioned to convene, perhaps in collaboration with the communication policy-focused Quello Center.

Primary takeaways

  • Digital inequality shows larger impacts on youth academic performance as compared to time spent on screens.

  • Digital skills play a significant role in mediating unstructured online engagement (social media use, playing video games, browsing the web) and youth academic, social, and psychosocial development.

  • Unstructured online engagement and face-to-face social interaction are complementary and continuously interact to create and enhance youth capital outcomes.


A familiar story: concerns of screen time

Today’s discussions of adolescent well-being have coalesced around a clear narrative: teenagers spend too much time online, and their academic performance, mental health, and social lives are deteriorating as a result. A steady stream of academic papers, books, and op-eds, alongside a growing number of policy proposals––school phone bans, age-gated social media use, restrictive screen-time limits––rest on the same underlying claim, aligning with a contemporary, digitized version of the displacement hypothesis:

Screen time, particularly the unstructured, free-time spent on social media, gaming, watching video content, or browsing the web, is said to displace the productive face-to-face activities that build adolescents into capable adults.

The implied and often practiced solution is restriction. In response, this dissertation tested this claim directly, and placed it within the broader context of adolescence.

Across three years, I followed 653 Michigan adolescents from early through late adolescence: in grades 8 or 9 (survey one, 2019) to grades 11 or 12 (survey two, 2022). Notably, these students, studied over time, were part of a broader pooled sample of 5,825 students across the same eighteen highschools. The study window captured the year before and the year after the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and related lockdown orders, functioning as an unprecedented stress test for theories of adolescent social, academic, and digital life and, importantly, as a benchmark to compare the effects of pandemic-related change and inequality to those effects from screen time alone.

Across four studies of adolescents, consisting of six cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses, findings are not consistent with the displacement narrative, nor the broader concerns about the time youth spend on screens.

Findings are, however, consistent with something the current public and (most) academic discussions have largely overlooked or ignored: the gaps and inequalities that determine whether adolescents can access and use the internet meaningfully in the first place.

What the displacement hypothesis overlooks

Displacement and related research and policy concerning the time young people spend online assumes a “zero-sum” model of adolescent day-to-day time. An hour online is an hour not spent studying, reading, sleeping, or interacting face-to-face (i.e., time spent on more productive or developmentally “better” activity).

Indeed, this makes sense logically. However, as an empirical claim, this model requires time spent online to behave differently from all other ways adolescents allocate time; it must produce uniquely negative outcomes and be inherently harmful across digital contexts, rather than the typical mix of trade-offs corresponding to, and often overlooked among any other social or developmental context.

Yet, online time does not differ from other youth activity. Instead, I find it has a mix of pros, cons, and even some “uniquely digital” benefits which youth utilize for social and academic gains. When I compared unstructured digital media use against traditional face-to-face interaction and activities, both produced similar patterns: some negative associations with academic outcomes, some null, and some positive.

Trade-offs within traditional face-to-face activity (for example, social time with friends and family, or time spent in after-school extracurriculars) are treated as ordinary developmental experiences that must be experienced for the betterment of development. The identical trade-offs involving digital time tend to be overlooked or ignored, and online engagement is perceived as altogether harmful.

A growing body of evidence, including this dissertation, do not support that distinction. Indeed, the developmental context is routinely misread, leaving out the context of the experiences and time spent on digital, as well as face-to-face activities, interactions, existing inequalities, and changes inherent to development. As such, I proposed a novel framework to understand these contexts:

Digital capital exchange

Rather than treating screen time as a unified harm, this dissertation advances an exchange”-based framework, grounded in James Coleman’s theories of youth capital and digital inequality scholarship, particularly following Eszter Hargittai, Jan van Dijk, and Alexander van Deursen (see this list of all dissertation references for full works).

The core proposition is that adolescents’ online engagement is not an alternative to developmental activity but another, albiet modern domain through which young people accumulate and mobilize online resources––particularly digital skills––that work alongside existing social networks and experiences to be exchanged for human capital (measured as: academic achievement, aspirations, STEM interest) and social capital (peer networks, community participation, extracurricular involvement).

Online time is not the mechanism; instead, it is digital skills that I find to be the most vital component in youth capital exchange and enhancement. Unstructured online engagement contributes to online skills; those skills, accumulated and mobilized alongside existing peer, family, and community networks, translate into the outcomes researchers and parents care about, i.e., academic achievement, aspirations, and face-to-face interaction and social networks.

This digital capital framework treats online and in-person contexts as complementary rather than antagonistic, and it situates adolescents’ digital lives within the structural conditions––connectivity quality, device reliability, autonomy of use––that determine whether exchange can occur at all.


Methods (in brief)

Paper-and-pencil surveys were administered to students in classrooms at two time-points: spring 2019 (N=2,876) and spring 2022 (N=2,949), across the same eighteen predominantly rural Michigan schools, grades 8–12. Official, nationally-ranked standardized reading, writing, and math test scores (PSAT 8/9, PSAT 10, SAT; College Board) were then anonymously linked to students’ survey responses with the help of participating districts.

Cross-sectional path analyses modeled pooled and wave-specific samples (pooled N=5,825); two-wave cross-lagged panel models tested reciprocal, longitudinal relationships on the 653 students who completed both surveys. Multi-group analyses of the cross-lagged panel models compared relationships between girls (N=345) and boys (N=308). All longitudinal models included time-invariant socioeconomic covariates as well as time-varying covariates to reduce omitted-variable bias.

Key findings: an overview

To summarize, to the best of my ability, eight chapters across 376 pages, I present two primary findings:

First: digital inequality predicted larger and more consistent declines in human capital than screen time did.

Unreliable home internet and technology maintenance problems––experiencing and/or dealing with broken or outdated devices and software, restrictive school-issued hardware, issues with connecting to or maintaining internet access––decreased youth GPA and standardized test achievement. And, these effect sizes were substantially larger than any negative direct effect from unstructured digital media use.

Across all four empirical studies, digital inequality emerged as the most substantial predictor of academic and developmental decline.

Second: digital skills mediated the relationship between online time and adolescent academic and social outcomes.

Unstructured digital media use, particularly online gaming and web browsing, predicted higher internet and social media skills for adolescents, which in turn predicted stronger academic achievement and self-efficacy (human capital), and social interaction and extracurricular participation (social capital). The positive indirect effect of screen time through skills offset or exceeded any small negative direct effects across several outcomes (supporting our existing peer-reviewed work: Hales & Hampton, 2025, and which you can read more about here).

These exchange processes were amplified when peer and family networks were modeled alongside digital skills, consistent with the premise that online and offline contexts operate together rather than in competition. The effect was not universal: social media skills amplified rather than offset a negative association with consistency of interest, one of the two subscales of grit. The exchange framework describes a contextual and conditional, domain-specific mechanism, not a blanket defense of time spent online.

Implications

If digital inequality, and not screen time, is the primary predictor of adolescent academic and developmental decline, and still warrants concern regarding access quality and experience even with the broader adoption of digital devices across the United States, the current policy emphasis on restriction is pointed at the wrong target. The evidence supports a different set of priorities.

Stable, reliable home (fast) broadband should be treated as an educational prerequisite rather than a consumer amenity. Unreliable connectivity exerted larger downward pressure on human capital than any measure of screen time, and that pressure intensified during the pandemic-era reliance on digital infrastructure. Technology maintenance, device repair, replacement, technical support, and the flexibility to install software and explore the web autonomously, matters as much as initial access, and school-issued devices that restrict autonomous use appear to hinder skill accumulation rather than support it.

Restrictive parental mediation of internet use was negatively associated with grit and self-efficacy at magnitudes comparable to the positive contributions of face-to-face activity. This challenges the assumption that digital restriction functions protectively. Instructive mediation, teaching adolescents to verify information, navigate platforms critically, and mobilize online resources toward meaningful ends, is the posture the data supports.

Finally, the technical skill-building that occurs through gaming, self-directed exploration, and deep web use is skill-building, not wasted time. Closing the persistent gender gap in these domains likely requires legitimizing technical play for girls, rather than restricting it for everyone.

None of the above is an argument that screen time is benign. It is an argument that screen time is the wrong focus, particularly when studied mostly in isolation. Context matters substantially, whether that is time spent on other activities during adolescence, the period of adolescence itself, digital inequality, resources gained from such online use, and how all such factors interact. The factor that predicts whether a given adolescent can convert online engagement into capital outcomes is structural: access, infrastructure, skills, and the autonomy to use them. These factors are distributed unevenly, and its uneven distribution, not hours logged, is what separates adolescents who thrive from those who fall behind.

The full dissertation is available through Michigan State University’s ProQuest archive, or see the embedded full-text PDF below. I’m happy to share papers, preprints, or the underlying framework with anyone interested and working in this area––don’t hesitate to reach out via my contact form. Thanks for reading.

Evolving Infrastructure Models: Telecom, Electricity & the IoT